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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Fleming v.
Ontario.1 The case is signiﬁcant because it is one of the very few police powers
cases in the past three decades in which the Supreme Court has declined to
recognize a new power.2 Since the pivotal case of Dedman,3 police powers
jurisprudence has been characterized by the recognition of increasingly more
intrusive common law powers to detain, investigate and search. This trend seemed
to reach its zenith in Saeed, in which a majority of the Court recognized a common
law power to conduct a warrantless penile swab incident to arrest — by force if
necessary — to preserve evidence of a possible sexual assault.4
It is therefore notable that in Fleming, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a
new common law police power to preventatively arrest a law-abiding individual in
*

Terry Skolnik is an Assistant Professor at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law (Civil
Law Section). Vanessa MacDonnell is an Associate Professor at the University of Ottawa
Faculty of Law (Common Law Section) and Co-Director of the uOttawa Public Law Centre.
We are grateful to Benjamin Berger, Sonia Lawrence and Emily Kidd White for inviting us
to be part of this special issue, and to Leo Russomanno, Anna Maria Konewka, Amar Khoday
and the anonymous peer reviewer for useful comments.
1

[2019] S.C.J. No. 45, 2019 SCC 45 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fleming SCC”].

2

Richard Jochelson et al., “Generation and Deployment of Common Law Police Powers
by Canadian Courts and the Double-Edged Charter” (2020) 28 Crit. Criminol. 107, at 116,
118.
3

R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.).

4

R. v. Saeed, [2015] S.C.J. No. 24, 2016 SCC 24 (S.C.C.).
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order to protect them from harm by third parties.5 In declining to embrace such a
power, the Court emphasized that police powers represent a signiﬁcant intrusion on
individual liberties.6 For Côté J., this counselled caution in the application of the
Waterﬁeld test (also known as the ancillary powers doctrine), the framework
currently used to determine whether the Court should recognize a novel common
law police power. Only powers that fall within the general scope of police duties and
that are reasonably necessary should be recognized, and any such power should be
narrowly construed.7
While the Court’s statements about the importance of individual liberties and the
need for narrow tailoring will no doubt be invoked by defence counsel in future
police powers cases, it is unlikely that Fleming represents a turning point in the
jurisprudence. The weight of authority continues to favour the recognition of police
powers. Moreover, the decision is likely to be distinguishable on the basis that the
power sought was an “extraordinary” one: authority to arrest a law-abiding
individual to prevent a breach of the peace by third parties.8 Indeed, some of the
Court’s statements in obiter might actually be relied upon to expand the scope of the
police’s power to detain in future cases.
Fleming’s progress through the courts serves a reminder of the doctrinal “creep”
that can result from a police powers analysis that proceeds by asking what powers
the police “need” rather than whether individual rights were respected.9 The fact that
a majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal was able to conclude that a power to
preventatively arrest an innocent person was justiﬁed in the circumstances is
evidence of the pull the ancillary powers doctrine exerts on courts. It is also
evidence of the degree to which the state has succeeded in convincing judges that
courts should grant powers to the police that the legislature has failed to confer upon
them, even if those powers infringe individual rights.
The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately rejected the proposed preventive arrest
power, explaining that it was unnecessary because the police have other options
available to them to prevent a breach of the peace. As we explain in this article,
however, the real problem with the power sought was not that it failed to satisfy
Waterﬁeld’s demand of reasonable necessity. The issue was that it would have
permitted the police to arrest a person not suspected of wrongdoing.
5

Fleming SCC, at para. 7.

6

Fleming SCC, at para. 5.

7

Fleming SCC, at paras. 38, 41.

8

Fleming SCC, at para. 78.

9

R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32, at para. 78 (S.C.C.), per Binnie J; R.
v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, 2005 SCC 37, at para. 81 (S.C.C.), LeBel J.
See generally Dov Fox, “Interest Creep” (2014) 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 273, at 277-78. See
also Vanessa MacDonnell, “Assessing the Impact of the Ancillary Powers Doctrine on Three
Decades of Charter Jurisprudence” (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 225, at 228.
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Arrest is a critical moment in the criminal process. It is generally the point at
which an individual becomes an “accused” and the criminal process is triggered.10
The requirement that police have reasonable grounds to believe that a person
committed, is committing or will commit a crime (the Criminal Code11 standard for
a valid warrantless search) acts as a safeguard against the unjustiﬁed application of
the criminal law by requiring objective evidence of probability of guilt before an
individual is arrested. Preventative arrests of law-abiding individuals do not satisfy
this standard and, we argue, should be considered “arbitrary” within the meaning of
section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.12 While the absence of
“reasonable necessity” is one reason why such a power would be unlikely to be
saved under section 1 of the Charter, it does not capture the essential reason why the
Court rightly rejected the power proposed in Fleming.
This article is structured as follows. Part II provides a brief overview of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Fleming. In Part III, we consider what impact Fleming
might have on the ancillary powers jurisprudence, before explaining why the case
exempliﬁes the Waterﬁeld test’s inherent dangers in Part IV.
II. THE CASE
In May 2009, Randolph Fleming was arrested by the Ontario Provincial Police
(O.P.P.) while attempting to participate in a protest near the Douglas Creek Estates
(D.C.E.) in Caledonia, Ontario.13 The historical and social context of the D.C.E. are
key to understanding the circumstances that led to Fleming’s arrest.14 The D.C.E.
and the surrounding territory are subject to land claims by the Six Nations dating
back several decades.15 In 2006, the Henco Corporation began to develop a new
10
James Stribopoulos, “Unchecked Power: The Constitutional Regulation of Arrest
Reconsidered” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 225, at 227.
11

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

12

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. On the importance of the “reasonable and probable
grounds to believe” standard, see Terry Skolnik, “The Suspicious Distinction Between
Reasonable Suspicion and Reasonable Grounds to Believe” (2016) 47 Ottawa L. Rev. 223,
at 247; Steven Penney, “Standards of Suspicion” (2017) 65 Crim. L.Q. 23, at 30-35; James
Stribopoulos, “Unchecked Power: The Constitutional Regulation of Arrest Reconsidered”
(2003) 48 McGill L.J. 225, at 227.
13

Fleming SCC, at para. 9.

14

For an overview of the conﬂict over the D.C.E., see Laura Devries, Conﬂict in Canada:
Aboriginal Land Rights and the Rule of Law (Vancouver: University of British Columbia
Press, 2011), ch. 2-4; John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2010), at 325, note 63.
15
Henco Industries Ltd. v. Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Council, [2006] O.J.
No. 4790, 82 O.R. (3d) 721, at paras. 14-15 (Ont. C.A.).
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subdivision on the D.C.E. lands.16 This led to the ongoing occupation of the D.C.E.
by members of the Six Nations and their allies as well as a road blockade.17 The
Province of Ontario eventually bought the D.C.E. in an effort to resolve the
situation, and the Government permitted the protests to persist on the land.18
Protests continued after the purchase.19 Other individuals and groups organized
counter-protests that resulted in violent encounters and police interventions.20
Fleming’s arrest took place during a “ﬂag rally” that had been planned for several
months by counter-protestors.21 Individuals associated with the Six Nations had
ﬂown Indigenous ﬂags along Argyle Street, which ran in front of the D.C.E.22 In
response, the counter-protestors decided to march down Argyle Street and hang a
Canadian ﬂag near the D.C.E.23 The O.P.P. told the organizers of the counter-protest
that they were prohibited from walking onto D.C.E. land.24 Shortly before the
scheduled counter-protest, police officers observed Fleming carrying a large ﬂag and
walking down Argyle Street to join the other counter-protestors. The police headed
toward Fleming to prevent him from entering the D.C.E.25 Fleming then went onto
the shoulder of Argyle Street, walked down a ditch, walked up its other side, and
stepped over a fence onto D.C.E. land.26 Officers yelled at Fleming to stop and step
back onto the shoulder. Fleming explained that he did not realize that the officers
were speaking to him.27
Once Fleming crossed onto D.C.E. land, a group of eight to ten unarmed
protestors who were occupying the land headed toward Fleming, with some
individuals walking while others jogged.28 The protestors did not threaten Flem16
Henco Industries Ltd. v. Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Council, [2006] O.J.
No. 4790, 82 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 17 (Ont. C.A.).
17
Henco Industries Ltd. v. Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Council, [2006] O.J.
No. 4790, 82 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 19 (Ont. C.A.).
18

Henco Industries Ltd. v. Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Council, [2006] O.J.
No. 4790, 82 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 49 (Ont. C.A.).
19

Henco Industries Ltd. v. Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Council, [2006] O.J.
No. 4790, 82 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 49 (Ont. C.A.).
20

Fleming SCC, at para. 10.

21

Fleming SCC, at para. 11.

22

Fleming SCC, at paras. 9, 11.

23

Fleming SCC, at paras. 9, 11.

24

Fleming SCC, at para. 13.

25

Fleming SCC, at para. 15.

26

Fleming SCC, at para. 16.

27

Fleming SCC, at para. 16.

28

Fleming SCC, at para. 17.
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ing.29 A police officer approached Fleming and told him that he was under arrest.30
He then escorted Fleming from the property and insisted that he put down the ﬂag.31
When Fleming refused, the officer pulled Fleming’s arm behind his back and
handcuffed him, which caused signiﬁcant pain and a chronic injury.32 Although
Fleming was charged with obstructing a police officer, the charges were dropped 19
months later.33 Fleming brought a civil action against both the Province and several
police officers, alleging that the police had arrested him unlawfully.34 In response,
the Province and the O.P.P. officers argued that the police had a common law power
to conduct a preventive arrest for Fleming’s own protection.35
The trial court ruled in Fleming’s favour, concluding that the police lacked the
power to conduct a preventative arrest in the circumstances. In the trial judge’s view,
although the police have a common law power to arrest an individual to prevent a
breach of the peace, the threat to public peace must be imminent, substantial, and
involve violence or harm for the power to be exercised lawfully.36 The trial judge
concluded that those conditions were not met because the protestors who approached Fleming were not violent.37 The court awarded damages to Fleming.
A majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge’s decision.
They concluded that the police do have a power of preventive arrest that can be
exercised for the arrestee’s own protection and, furthermore, that Fleming’s arrest
was lawful.38 The majority disagreed with the trial judge’s ﬁndings of fact and found
that the arrest was necessary because “[t]he rushing protestors posed a risk, both to
the public peace and to the respondent individually”.39 Justice Huscroft dissented.
In his view, the majority had interfered with the trial judge’s ﬁndings of fact and
inﬂated the risk of harm to Fleming, notably by suggesting that the protesters rushed
toward him and that he was in imminent and substantial danger.40 Since there was
29

Fleming SCC, at para. 17.

30

Fleming SCC, at para. 17.

31

Fleming SCC, at para. 18.

32

Fleming SCC, at para. 18.

33

Fleming SCC, at para. 21.

34

Fleming SCC, at para. 22.

35

Fleming SCC, at para. 6.

36

Fleming SCC, at para. 25. The trial court relied on Brown v. Durham Regional Police
Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274, 43 O.R. (3d) 223 (Ont. C.A.) to conclude that there was
common law power to conduct arrests to prevent a breach of the peace.
37

Fleming SCC, at para. 25.

38

Fleming SCC, at para. 29.

39

Fleming v. Ontario, [2018] O.J. No. 841, 2018 ONCA 160, at para. 53 (Ont. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Fleming ONCA”].
40

Fleming ONCA, at paras. 109-110.
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no such danger, it was not necessary to arrest Fleming to prevent a breach of the
peace.41 Justice Huscroft concluded that Fleming’s arrest was unlawful because he
was exercising his constitutional right to freedom of expression and did not commit
a criminal offence.42
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously allowed the appeal and concluded
that Fleming’s arrest was unlawful. The Court applied the Waterﬁeld test to
determine whether the proposed ancillary power should be recognized in the
circumstances.43 Writing for the Court, Côté J. concluded that the state had satisﬁed
the ﬁrst part of the Waterﬁeld test by demonstrating that the power to conduct
preventive arrests was consistent with a valid law enforcement duty, namely
protecting life and property.44 However, she then went on to ﬁnd that the power was
not reasonably necessary to protect life and property, for several reasons. The
proposed preventive arrest power impacted law-abiding citizens, was justiﬁed
principally on grounds of deterrence, would be difficult for courts to review
properly, and statutory powers of arrest already existed.45 Justice Côté observed that
a police power to conduct preventive arrests of law-abiding citizens would be
“extraordinary”, especially because the police could limit individual freedom
without suspecting or believing that the person was involved in criminal activity.46
For these reasons, the Court rejected the proposed ancillary power and found
Fleming’s arrest to be unlawful.47
III. SIGNIFICANCE

OF

FLEMING

FOR THE

POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE

From unlikely origins, the ancillary powers doctrine has emerged as a major
source of police powers in Canada. Indeed, when one examines the range of
common law powers the police now enjoy, it is difficult to see how the term
“ancillary” remains apt. The power to detain for investigative purposes, to search
incident to investigative detention, to stop vehicles at random, and to search incident
to arrest are at the core of everyday police work.48
The Supreme Court of Canada ﬁrst articulated the test for recognizing new
common law police powers in Dedman, decided in 1985. In doing so, the majority
drew heavily on the English case of R. v. Waterﬁeld.49 Waterﬁeld was not a police
41

Fleming ONCA, at paras. 109-110.

42

Fleming ONCA, at para. 112.

43

Fleming SCC, at para. 101.

44

Fleming SCC, at paras. 69-73.

45

Fleming SCC, at paras. 76, 93-95.

46

Fleming SCC, at para. 78.

47

Fleming SCC, at para. 101.

48

See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan et al., “Stops and Stares: Street Stops, Surveillance, and Race
in the New Policing” (2016) 43 Fordham Urb. L.J. 539, at 561.
49

[1964] 1 Q.B. 164.
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powers case. Rather, it was concerned with whether the accused had committed the
offence of “assaulting a police officer in the due course of their duties”. To determine
whether the offence was made out, the English Court of Appeal set out a two-part
test for evaluating whether police action falls within the course of their duties.50 In
Dedman, the Waterﬁeld test was re-imagined as a framework for determining
whether new common law police powers should be recognized. Applying the test in
that case, the majority concluded that the police had been acting within the scope of
their common law powers when they stopped Dedman during a random roadside
R.I.D.E. program to check for signs of impairment.
In its current formulation, the ancillary powers doctrine requires the Supreme
Court to begin by “clearly deﬁn[ing] the police power that is being asserted and the
liberty interests that are at stake”.51 The Court then applies the Waterﬁeld test. At the
ﬁrst stage of the test, the Court asks whether “the police action at issue fall[s] within
the general scope of a statutory or common law police duty”.52 If the answer is yes,
the Court proceeds to the second stage, where the question is whether “the action
involve[s] a justiﬁable exercise of police powers associated with that duty”.53 To be
justiﬁed, the power must be reasonably necessary. The Court has identiﬁed several
factors to consider in determining whether reasonable necessity is made out,
including: “the importance of the performance of the duty to the public good”; “the
necessity of the interference with individual liberty for the performance of the duty”;
and “the extent of the interference with individual liberty”.54 The burden of
satisfying these requirements rests with the state.55
In police powers cases, the courts have invariably concluded that the power
sought is sufficiently connected to the officer’s general statutory and common law
duties, which include “preserving the peace, preventing crime, and protecting life
and property”.56 The analysis has thus tended to focus on the second stage of the
test, where the state must establish reasonable necessity.57 This stage requires courts
to balance the need for the power against the intrusion on individual rights.58 As the
50

R. v. Waterﬁeld, [1964] 1 Q.B. 164; Fleming SCC, at para. 43; James Stribopoulos, “In
Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s
L.J. 1, at 18.
51

Fleming SCC, at para. 46.

52

Fleming SCC, at para. 46.

53

Fleming SCC, at para. 46.

54

Fleming SCC, at para. 47. See also R. v. MacDonald, [2014] S.C.J. No. 3, 2014 SCC
3, at para. 37 (S.C.C.).
55

Fleming SCC, at para. 48.

56

Fleming SCC, at para. 79.

57

Steve Coughlan, “Arbitrary Detention: Whither – or Wither? – Section 9” (2008) 40
S.C.L.R. (2d) 147, at 172.
58

Fleming SCC, at paras. 47, 55.
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Court noted in Fleming, and as has been noted elsewhere, there are similarities
between this stage of the Waterﬁeld test and the proportionality analysis set out in
R. v. Oakes.59
The application of the ancillary powers doctrine has resulted in the recognition of
a range of new common law police powers, including the power to: detain an
individual brieﬂy for investigative purposes;60 search incident to arrest;61 conduct
random vehicle stops;62 conduct a strip search incident to arrest;63 take a penile
swab upon arrest to preserve evidence of a possible sexual assault;64 conduct canine
sniff searches in public places, including schools and bus stations and at the
roadside;65 set up a roadblock following a tip that a gun is in the vicinity;66 and set
up a roadblock to screen for signs of impairment, among others.67
From the beginning, judicial recognition of police powers has been controversial.
Much of the criticism has focused on the propriety of courts creating new police
powers as opposed to legislatures. James Stribopoulos has argued that courts should
not recognize new common law police powers at the expense of individual liberties
because it is inconsistent with their rights-protecting role.68 He has also noted that
judges’ willingness to recognize new police powers has resulted in courts being
primarily responsible for creating these powers as opposed to democratically elected
59

[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). See Fleming SCC, at para. 54. See
also Vanessa MacDonnell, “Assessing the Impact of the Ancillary Powers Doctrine on Three
Decades of Charter Jurisprudence” (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 225, at 228; Richard Jochelson,
“Ancillary Issues with Oakes: The Development of the Waterﬁeld Test and the Problem of
Fundamental Constitutional Theory” (2012-13) 43 Ottawa L. Rev. 355, at 365-69; Richard
Jochelson, “Crossing the Rubicon: of Sniffer Dogs, Justiﬁcations, and Preemptive Deference”
(2008) 13 Rev. Const. Stud. 209, at 219-24.
60

R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.).

61

Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] S.C.J. No. 10, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.).

62

R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 (S.C.C.).

63

R. v. Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, 2001 SCC 83 (S.C.C.).

64

R. v. Saeed, [2015] S.C.J. No. 24, 2016 SCC 24 (S.C.C.).

65

R. v. Kang-Brown, [2008] S.C.J. No. 18, 2008 SCC 18 (S.C.C.); R. v. M. (A.), [2008]
S.C.J. No. 19, 2008 SCC 19 (S.C.C.); R. v. Chehil, [2013] S.C.J. No. 49, 2013 SCC 49
(S.C.C.); R. v. MacKenzie, [2013] S.C.J. No. 50, 2013 SCC 50 (S.C.C.).
66

R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32 (S.C.C.).

67

R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.).

68

James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and
the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1 at 55; James Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment?
Investigative Detention: Ten Years Later” (2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 335, at 352, 382-83. See
also David Paciocco, “Constitutional Deﬂation and the Rebound Effect: The Charter and the
Enhancement of State Power” (2007) Can. Iss. 89, at 92; Tim Quigley, “The Impact of the
Charter on the Law of Search and Seizure” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 117, at 139.
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lawmakers.69 This raises legitimacy concerns.
Courts may also lack the institutional competence to create police powers that do
not misﬁre and/or lead to injustices.70 While the quality of the legislative process
may vary, statutory police powers are nonetheless the product of a democratic
process by which lawmakers gather information, debate potential provisions,
receive input from stakeholders and committees, and reﬁne the law prior to Royal
Assent.71 Courts do not follow such a process, nor can they. Judges are unable to
gather information like other branches of government, and are bound by whatever
evidence the parties and interveners present.72 Courts’ democratic and informational
deﬁcits may lead judges to develop police powers that produce errors and/or create
adverse consequences: lack of police accountability, racial proﬁling, and ex-post
justiﬁcations by the police for otherwise unlawful conduct, among others.
Scholars have also raised questions about the Waterﬁeld test itself, which was not
designed for the purpose it now serves and is propelled by an assessment of what
powers the police require rather than by a focus on individual rights.73 David
Paciocco argues that Waterﬁeld has resulted in “constitutional deﬂation”, meaning
that constitutional rights are weakened as courts accord greater importance to the
state interests that are said to justify police powers.74 A quick glance at the
jurisprudence conﬁrms the impact of this development. In the vast majority of police
powers cases since Dedman, the Supreme Court has granted rather than withheld
powers.75 In some cases, it has recognized the existence of a common law power but
then gone on to conclude that the scope of the power was exceeded on the facts of
69

James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and
the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1, at 55. See also Glen Luther, “Police Power and the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Creation or Control” (1986) 51 Sask. L. Rev. 217, at 227.
70

Martin Friedland, “Criminal Justice in Canada Revisited” (2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 419, at
448-50; James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and
the Charter” 2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1, at 56-57.
71

Cass Sunstein, “The Most Knowledgeable Branch” (2016) 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1607, at
1616-17.
72

Cass Sunstein, “The Most Knowledgeable Branch” (2016) 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1607, at
1613-15.
73
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32, at para. 78 (S.C.C.), per Binnie J;
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, 2005 SCC 37, at para. 81 (S.C.C.), LeBel
J. See generally Dov Fox, “Interest Creep” (2014) 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 273, at 277-78. See
also Vanessa MacDonnell, “Assessing the Impact of the Ancillary Powers Doctrine on Three
Decades of Charter Jurisprudence” (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 225, at 228.
74

David Paciocco, “Constitutional Deﬂation and the Rebound Effect: The Charter and
the Enhancement of State Power” (2007) Can. Iss. 89, at 89-91.
75

Richard Jochelson et al., “Generation and Deployment of Common Law Police Powers
by Canadian Courts and the Double-Edged Charter” (2020) 28 Crit. Criminol. 107, at 116,
118.
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the case. In Mann, for example, the Court held that a police officer may conduct a
pat-down search incident to investigative detention for reasons of officer safety, but
that the officer in Mann had acted outside the scope of his authority when he reached
into Mann’s pocket after feeling a soft object inside it.76 Once a common law power
is created, however, it may be validly exercised by the police as long as the
circumstances justify it, regardless of whether the power was exercised properly in
the case in which it was ﬁrst recognized.77
Perhaps because “we have crossed the Rubicon”, as Binnie J. put it in
Kang-Brown,78 more recent debates have tended to focus on the standard for
invoking powers to detain, investigate and search rather than on whether such
powers should be recognized at all. The tendency toward expansive recognition of
police powers has been accompanied by the adoption of less demanding standards
for triggering the exercise of common law powers. For example, the power to detain
brieﬂy for investigative purposes recognized in Mann is triggered on a standard of
reasonable suspicion, as is the power to conduct a canine search of a public area.79
In some circumstances, standards are jettisoned completely, as is the case with
R.I.D.E. programs, during which individuals may be subjected to questions about
their sobriety in the absence of any evidence to believe that they might be impaired
by alcohol.
Finally, there is serious concern about how the expansion of common law powers
impacts over-policed communities.80 As the list of common law police powers
grows, the range of tools the police have at their disposal to police marginalized
communities expands.81 Counterintuitively, the less intrusive powers may cast the
longest shadow. Routine, “low-visibility” encounters with the police are often sites
of discrimination and harassment, particularly since many such encounters do not
result in charges being laid or judicial review of police misconduct.82 One of the
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most signiﬁcant problems with the ancillary powers doctrine, therefore, is that it
provides cover for arbitrary exercises of police power.
Against this backdrop, Fleming stands out as an exception to a problematic
pattern of courts authorizing new common law police powers. For that reason alone,
it is signiﬁcant. Although the Court did not seek to distance itself from its past
jurisprudence in Fleming, it stated that common law police powers must be
“carefully deﬁned”83 and individual rights centered in the ancillary powers
analysis.84 Justice Côté explained that the power sought in the case “would involve
substantial prima facie interference with signiﬁcant liberty interests”, including the
right to be free from arbitrary arrest, the right to life, liberty and security of the
person, and freedom of expression, since Fleming was taking part in a protest. She
emphasized that “few police actions interfere with an individual’s liberty more than
arrest — an action which completely restricts the person’s ability to move about in
society free from state coercion”.85
In addition, she explained, the power sought in Fleming would permit the police
to arrest an individual not suspected of wrongdoing. Noting that “[t]he [Waterﬁeld]
standard of justiﬁcation must be commensurate with the fundamental rights at
stake”, Côté J. stated: “There are a number of reasons why the ‘standard of
justiﬁcation’ is especially stringent here. The characteristics of the power, and in
particular its impact on law-abiding individuals, its preventative nature and the fact
that it would be evasive of review, all mean that it will be more difficult to justify
as reasonably necessary compared to other common law powers. The bar is
higher.”86 When weighed against the liberty interests at stake, the Court concluded
that the balance favoured individual rights. Speciﬁcally, the power could not be
shown to be necessary because there were other options available to the police to
prevent a breach of the peace.
Despite the Court’s strong language, however, it seems unlikely that Fleming will
slow the development of common law police powers. The case law remains heavily
inclined toward the recognition of ancillary powers. Judges have largely embraced
the role of authorizing new powers where they perceive existing police powers to be
deﬁcient. In recent cases, courts have tended to be more preoccupied with the
appropriate standard for triggering the use of the power and with ensuring that
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powers are tailored so as to minimize overreach. Fleming does not provide guidance
on either of these issues, and, as such, its precedential value is likely to be limited.
One of the most problematic aspects of the Fleming decision is that it may in fact
provide a basis for expanding police powers in future cases. In Fleming, the
Supreme Court observed that courts in England and Ireland have recognized a
common law power to detain individuals not suspected of wrongdoing to prevent a
violent breach of the peace that is imminent and likely to occur, provided that no less
intrusive means are available.87 Yet the Court did not expressly rule out that power’s
existence, meaning that the possibility of preventive detention of law-abiding people
— especially during protests or broader civil unrest — could be recognized in the
future. The decision sends an unfortunate signal to police officers that there is some
precedent for conducting preventive detentions that operate on the margins of
legality.
While Fleming places a great deal of emphasis on the way the power sought
would negatively impact individual liberties, the Court has recognized other
common law powers that have a signiﬁcant effect on individual rights, such as the
power to conduct a strip search and a penile swab. In other words, the courts have
rarely considered a power too intrusive to warrant recognition, particularly where
they are of the view that it corresponds to an urgent law enforcement need. What
seems to distinguish Fleming from these cases is that the proposed power would
have a signiﬁcant impact on the rights of a person not suspected of wrongdoing. In
other words, the key defect in the police power sought in Fleming was that it would
have authorized the arrest of an innocent person.
In our view, such an arrest power, if recognized, would violate the prohibition on
arbitrary detention and imprisonment found in section 9 of the Charter. Prior to the
Charter, an arrest was considered lawful if it was authorized by a statutory or
common law rule.88 For an arrest to be valid in the Charter era, we argue, the arrest
must be authorized by law, the law must not be arbitrary and the arrest cannot be
carried out arbitrarily.89 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on arbitrary detention
supports this view. In Grant and Suberu, the Supreme Court explained that a
detention will be arbitrary for section 9 purposes if it is not authorized by law, or if
87
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“the law authorizing the detention is itself arbitrary”.90 It held that the minimum
constitutional standard for conducting an investigative detention is reasonable
grounds to suspect that an individual is engaged in criminal activity. Detentions in
the absence of reasonable suspicion are considered arbitrary because there is
insufficient evidence that the accused transgressed the law and did something
wrong.
While the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the minimum constitutional standard
for a valid warrantless arrest, we agree with Stribopoulos that the standard in the
criminal context ought to be reasonable grounds to believe that an individual has
committed, is committing or will commit a criminal offence.91 It has never been
suggested that anything other than reasonable grounds could justify the exercise of
the power of arrest; indeed, this is partly what led the Court in Mann to develop a
common law power to detain individuals brieﬂy for investigative purposes on a
standard of reasonable suspicion.92 It has certainly never been suggested that the
requirement of some belief in wrongdoing could be dispensed with entirely so as to
permit the police to arrest an individual who is not the subject of any suspicion.
While this view is partly informed by a standard established by the Criminal Code
— reasonable grounds is what is required by the general arrest power, for example
— the Supreme Court’s case law suggests that this standard is now the constitutional
baseline. The investigative detention cases set the minimum standard for a valid
investigative detention at reasonable suspicion. An arrest limits individual liberty to
a greater extent than investigative detention. Furthermore, officers who arrest
individuals also have the authority to search them, their property and their
immediate environment. Given that arrest restricts liberty to a greater degree than
investigative detention, it stands to reason that the constitutional threshold for arrest
must be higher: reasonable and probable grounds should be necessary.
The fact that an arrest frequently triggers the criminal process against an accused
also militates in favour of a constitutional standard of reasonable and probable
grounds. As the crime control model of criminal justice teaches us, once the system
is engaged, it is designed to produce a guilty plea or a ﬁnding of guilt at the end of
a trial.93 Arrests are often the ﬁrst step toward an array of police interactions — such
90
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as police investigations, interrogations and remand in custody — that can lead to
wrongful convictions or incentivize innocent people to plead guilty.94 For this
reason, the criminal process should only be triggered where there is sufficient
justiﬁcation, in the form of objectively discernible facts showing that a particular
person is probably guilty of a particular crime.95 This high standard guards against
the wrongful invocation of the criminal process and its devastating collateral
consequences.
The application of the ancillary powers doctrine in Fleming obscures the fact that
the failure to meet the constitutional threshold for arrest was the central issue in the
case. Instead of focusing on that issue, the Court ﬁrst asked whether the power fell
within the general scope of the police’s duties, and then whether it was reasonably
necessary. The Court concluded that the power was not reasonably necessary
because the police had other tools at their disposal to prevent a breach of the peace.
But this outcome is unsatisfactory because it does not capture the constitutional
defect in the power sought. In other words, the Court in Fleming arrived at the right
outcome for the wrong reasons.
In our view, the absence of the essential safeguard of reasonable and probable
grounds is what may well have struck the Court in Fleming as problematic. The fact
that this key element is buried in an analysis trained on the “reasonable necessity”
of the power demonstrates the dangers inherent in the ancillary powers test.
Occasionally, the courts will muddle through the analysis and conclude that the
burden on rights is insufficiently justiﬁed, as the Court did here. But we know that
Fleming is an exception to a well-entrenched practice of recognizing new police
powers. Indeed, both the trial court and the majority of the Court of Appeal
concluded that the police had a power to preventatively arrest innocent individuals
for their own protection, though they disagreed on whether the circumstances
justiﬁed the application of the power in the case before them. This is what the
Waterﬁeld test permits, and, by its structure, often encourages.
Dov Fox contends that when judges recognize the importance of state interests
(such as public safety) to justify governmental power, it can result in “interest
creep”.96 Judges will increasingly rely on that interest in future decisions, strengthening its jurisprudential value and often broadening its deﬁnition.97 Ultimately, the
weight and scope of the governmental interest will expand and creep into other areas
of the law at the cost of individual rights.98 Similarly, the cumulative effect of prior
decisions that recognize new police powers frame how judges decide future cases.
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When courts decide cases in ways that expand police powers at the expense of
individual rights, subsequent decisions that build on that precedent and further
constrain individual rights seem less extreme than they otherwise would.99 This
partly explains how the Supreme Court of Canada was able to recognize a common
law power to conduct warrantless penile swabs. The Court compared that measure’s
intrusiveness to warrantless strip searches, a common law power that the Supreme
Court of Canada recognized several years earlier.100 The cumulative weight of
jurisprudence affirming new police powers pulls judges toward condoning police
conduct that is not expressly authorized by law and, as we explain now, that bears
many of the hallmarks of inconsistency with the rule of law: arbitrariness,
retroactivity and unpredictability.
IV. ANCILLARY POWER AND

THE

RULE

OF

LAW

The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Fleming highlights the importance of
interpreting the ancillary powers doctrine restrictively to protect individuals against
arbitrary exercises of police power. The Supreme Court of Canada has observed that
the ancillary powers doctrine serves to ﬁll “perceived gaps in the law”.101 Judges
affirm the existence of new common law police powers they deem necessary to
further certain law enforcement objectives in circumstances where Parliament has
not legislated such a power.102 The corollary of this is that judges should not
generally recognize new police powers or expand existing ones where Parliament
appears to have exhaustively set out a power’s scope. If a court broadens law
enforcement’s authority beyond the legal framework Parliament has provided —
here, arrest on reasonable grounds — the court undermines the constitutional
protection against arbitrary police action.
In various decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada has noted that state power is
exercised arbitrarily when it is not authorized by law, a consideration the Court
relied on heavily in deciding R. v. Le this year, yet which it overlooked in
Fleming.103 When Parliament sets out a police power’s scope prospectively, the
legislator determines what is — and what is not — authorized by law. In doing so,
99
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the legislator draws a bright line, signalling that conduct not authorized by the law
should be considered arbitrary. This is true of the police’s powers of arrest. Penney,
Rondinelli and Stribopoulos explain that “[p]olice arrest powers have long been
codiﬁed in Canada. When it comes to arrests for criminal offences, the Criminal
Code contains a comprehensive set of police powers”, which sit alongside arrest
powers found in provincial trespass and other legislation.104
Section 495 of the Criminal Code provides the general legal framework for
warrantless arrests. Subsection 495(1)(a) states that a police officer has the power to
arrest an individual without a warrant where the officer has reasonable grounds to
believe that the individual committed or will commit an indictable offence. Section
31(1) of the Criminal Code empowers peace officers to arrest a person to prevent a
breach of the peace, meaning conduct that is violent and creates a risk of harm.105
This latter provision largely overlaps with section 495 of the Criminal Code because
violent conduct that creates a risk of harm to others is likely captured by some
existing indictable offence. Section 495.1 allows for a warrantless arrest of a person
“if a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that an accused has contravened
or is about to contravene a summons, appearance notice, undertaking or release
order”. These provisions exhaustively set out the circumstances in which police
officers may conduct preventive arrests and in which cases such arrests are unlawful
and arbitrary.106 The law does not authorize police to arrest individuals for
prospective summary conviction offences. Nor does it authorize the police to
preventatively arrest individuals to prevent harm to those individuals. Both of these
types of preventative arrests are unlawful and arbitrary because they are not
authorized by law within the meaning of section 9 of the Charter.
If the Supreme Court of Canada were to recognize an ancillary power to conduct
preventive arrests that Parliament has not authorized, the concept of arbitrariness
would lose much of its importance. Arbitrariness would be deﬁned more by what
judges authorize after the fact and less by what Parliament dictates is lawful before
the fact. Such an approach would raise fairness concerns and place the legitimacy
of a judicially created preventive arrest power into question. Since the criminal law
profoundly impacts the accused person’s interests, courts should interpret statutory
police powers narrowly rather than use the ancillary power doctrine to expand
them.107
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The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Fleming thus contributes to our
understanding of the relationship between statutory police powers and arbitrariness.
It suggests that where Parliament has exhaustively deﬁned a police power such that
there is no legislative gap for courts to ﬁll, as is the case with the power of arrest,
police action is arbitrary when it goes beyond what Parliament has authorized.
The Fleming decision demonstrates the tension between common law police
powers and the rule of law in a second way. A crucial aspect of the rule of law is
that the law — and the scope of public officials’ powers — should be known in
advance.108 When police powers are clearly set out in a statute, individuals can
understand the scope of their rights, comprehend the limits of state power and seek
redress when officers exceed their authority.109 Statutory police powers also
promote the rule of law by helping the police understand which types of action are
lawful and incentivizes them to act lawfully in order to avoid sanctions.110
If courts dilute the importance of arbitrariness by expanding the scope of
exhaustively legislated powers, individuals cannot know in advance whether police
action is legitimate.111 Furthermore, police can act at the margins of legality and
invoke the ancillary powers doctrine to justify their prima facie unlawful conduct
after the fact.112
One response might be to say that Parliament can modify or constrain a judicially
recognized police power that misﬁres. Yet Parliament rarely does so. Moreover, as
Stribopoulos points out, the ancillary powers doctrine disincentivizes lawmakers
from modifying judicially created police powers.113
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have suggested that a critical analysis of the Fleming decision
produces a number of important insights. First, it highlights the essential conceptual
link between the power of arrest and wrongdoing by the accused. It demonstrates
why it is unconstitutional and arbitrary for the police to arrest innocent individuals,
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including for their own protection. Second, it strongly suggests that the minimum
constitutional standard for arrests in the criminal context is reasonable grounds to
believe that the individual committed, is committing or will commit a crime. Third,
it illustrates the importance of interpreting the notion of arbitrariness broadly when
assessing the lawfulness of police action. It shows why police action that exceeds
the scope of exhaustively legislated powers is arbitrary, and, furthermore, why
courts should not dilute the importance of arbitrariness by enlarging police powers
beyond their exhaustively deﬁned statutory limits. It suggests that the Supreme
Court of Canada has normalized arbitrary police action through its police powers
jurisprudence by retroactively condoning police conduct that was not authorized by
Parliament at the time it was taken.
The need to maintain a central role for arbitrariness as a check on police power
explains why Parliament should speciﬁcally legislate law enforcement powers and
why courts should be reluctant to recognize new common law arrest powers. Yet this
article’s arguments are equally applicable to other sections of the Charter as well.
Courts should also be particularly reluctant to recognize new search powers because
it also normalizes arbitrariness within section 8 Charter jurisprudence.
Although the Supreme Court of Canada has shown an increasing willingness to
recognize novel police powers within the past several decades, Fleming breaks with
the trend. However, it remains to be seen whether the Court’s decision will
ultimately expand police powers in the long-term, notably, by opening the door to
preventative detentions of law-abiding individuals to prevent violent and imminent
breaches of the peace. When the Court is faced with another such case, it should
demonstrate a renewed commitment to the basic values that the ancillary powers
doctrine has progressively diminished over time: the rule of law, the separation of
powers and the protection of minority groups.114
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